Abstract--In this note, we describe the compromise set for a special polyhedral convex feasible set. This procedure gives the monotonicity of the compromise set. This scenario appears in some engineering and economic applications like the determination of the consumer's equilibrium. (~)
INTRODUCTION
In [1] , the authors stated that, under certain conditions, the compromise set in multicriteria problems enjoys monotonicity properties similar to those in the bicriteria case (see [2, 3] for basic definitions and results of Compromise Programming).
The proofs in [1] were not constructive, that is, we established different properties without an explicit description of the compromise set. It seems to be a hard problem to get a suitable parameterization of that set in the general case.
The aim of this note is to give an explicit description of the compromise set provided the linearity of the production-transformation function. This particular case arises in some engineering and economics problems. Thus, the feasible set in consumer theory is bounded by a budgetary constraint defined by a hyperplane with coefficients equal to the prices of the different goods.
The authors have been supported by the Direccidn General de Ensefianza Superior (DGES), Madrid, Spain. The fourth author has been also supported by the Consejerfa de Educacidn y Cultura de la Comunidad de Madrid, Madrid, Spain.
0893-9659/00/$ -see front matter (~) 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Typeset by .Ah/rS-TEX PII: S0893-9659 (00)00039-2 It is well known that fixing a p-norm (1 < p < oo) in R n and a nonempty convex subset, the best approximation problem (for every point in ~n) has a unique solution. Therefore, when we consider the utopia point X* of the feasible set U (see [2] ), we obtain a function L(p), p E (1, c~), where L(p) denotes the point where the minimum of the p-distance from X* to U is reached.
An example given by Freimer and Yu [4] shows that, in general, the set L((1, c~)) can have some pathologies related to the possibility of ordering that set in such a way that the function L is monotone (maybe not strictly). This problem is connected to some topological properties of L((1, oo)) as topological subspace of ]~n.
A different type of difficulty can be found if we consider p = 1 and p = oc. In this case, the function
is, in general, multivalued. In this paper, we show, by constructing the compromise set, that for a linear production-transformation function, the set L((1, c~)) can be naturally ordered in such a way that L is monotone. On the other hand, it is possible to obtain a natural continuous selection of the multivalued map, simply taking limits p --* oo and p --* 1 L : [1, c~] ~ U such that it can be used to redefine the compromise set in the absence of unicity of L(1) and L(cx~). Thus, the efficient set is the part of the hyperplane which contains the points A1,A2,..., An that lies in the positive cone (this corresponds to a transformation hypersurface with constant marginal rates of substitution). The ideal point is X* = (al,...,an). We can suppose that al >_ a2 _> ... >_ an > 0 (in other words, it is possible to change the variables in order to get it). STEP 2. Fix k E {1,..., n}. The affine subvariety and the convex set spanned by A1,..., Ak will be denoted by Ilk and Ck, respectively. Let Rk(p) E IIk the p-projection (1 < p < co) of X* over Ilk, i.e., the only (see [4, Lemma 2.1]) point in Ilk such that dp(X* Rk(p))= min dp(X*,X).
FINDING THE MINIMUM FOR p-NORMS

' XEHk
These points Rk(p) will help us to find the compromise solution corresponding to the p-metric. By using Lagrange multipliers method, we get that
---gj~=l 3a:-p/(p-j a:, --:-j~=l 3aTp/(p-j a2,
... ,
aT/(P-:) j=l ak,0,...,01 .
Clearly, Rk is a continuous map. We also define Lk(p) E Ck as the p-projection of X* over Ck. When 1 < p _< co, it is given by the expression dp (X*, Lk (p)) = min dp (X*, X) 
., n} such that L(p) = Lk(p) = Rk(p).
In
this sense, when p E (1, co] verifies L(p) = Lk(p) ~ Lk-:(p), equivalently L(p) E Ck --Ck-1, by virtue of Step 3. necessarily Rk(p) E Ck, thus L(p) = Lk(p) = Rk(p).
On the other hand, take the k-component function of Rk, fk : (1, co) ~ R, defined by In this manner, 1 = Pl -< P2 <-"'" <-Pn <-Pn+l = oo and the family {(Pk,Pk+l] : k = 1,. 
L(zm) = Lk(zm) = Rk(zm),
for all rn E N. So, as limm~ zm = Pk, from the final remark in Step 5, Rk(q) = Lk(q) for every q > Pk, in particular, Rk(po) = Lk(po), ( 
Our assumption, L(po) c Ck-1, implies that the k TM coordinate of Rk(po), fk(P0), is nonpositive. Recall that Rk(q) = Lk(q) for all q > Pk, thus, the k th coordinate of Rk(q), fk(q), is nonnegative. In this way, since the function fk is not decreasing and Pk < Po, necessarily fk(q) = fk(Po) = 0 (q > Pk) and ak ..... al. Consequently, L1,...,Lk will be constant functions and 
STEP 7. Thus, for p ~ (Pk-1, Pk], the last n-k + 1 coordinates of L(p) are not decreasing (in fact, the last n-k coordinates are null). Theorem 2.1. allows us to give an order to the points in the compromise set. STEP 8. For the sake of clearness, we will study in depth the three-criteria case. So, consider U= co(A,B,C,O). The problems with three criteria involved lead to six different classes of compromise sets, depending on the relations between the coordinates of the feasible set vertices. They are described in Figure 2 . 
